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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 American water law reflects the diverse geography and population 
patterns of this expansive country.1 In the eastern states, where wa-
ter is rather abundant, the doctrine of riparian rights dominates wa-
ter law.2 The arid western states, in contrast, rejected the doctrine of 
riparian rights in favor of the doctrine of prior appropriation due to a 
natural scarcity of water and increasing population growth.3 The 
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 1. William L. Andreen, The Evolving Contours of Water Law in the United States: 
Bridging the Gap Between Water Rights, Land Use and the Protection of the Aquatic Envi-
ronment, 23 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 5 (2006); Jane Maslow Cohen, Of Waterbanks, Piggy-
banks, and Bankruptcy: Changing Directions in Water Law: Foreword, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1809, 1813 (2005).  
 2. Andreen, supra note 1, at 9. Although the doctrine of riparian rights is prevalent 
in the eastern states, nearly half of them “have supplemented the riparian rights system 
with permit schemes governing large water withdrawals” because of increasing demand 
and competition in the East for water. Id.  
 3. See, e.g., Andreen, supra note 1, at 8-9 (discussing the origins of American water 
law and the distinctions between the doctrines of riparian rights and prior appropriation); 
see also In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Envtl. Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings, 34 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 696 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (generally chronicling California’s historic and re-
curring water shortages and concerns as well as the water problems plaguing Mexico and 
other western states such as Colorado, Arizona, and Nevada); Reed D. Benson, So Much 
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western states provide fertile ground to consider the burdens of a 
rapidly growing region on already scarce water resources.4 
 My thesis is that the public trust doctrine is being underutilized 
by the states and that the optimal approach to the western states’ 
water scarcity dilemma is one that applies the public trust doctrine 
more aggressively while simultaneously diminishing the applicability 
of the prior appropriation doctrine with its inherently private prop-
erty approach to water resource entitlement.5 There are two ways to 
conceptualize a more robust public trust doctrine. The first is to ex-
pand the waters that are subject to the public trust doctrine, essen-
tially an expansion of location. The second way is to increase the doc-
trine’s reach to include additional purposes and uses within the pro-
tection of the doctrine. I recommend extending the public trust doc-
trine to encompass all bodies of water serving the public welfare, 
even minimally.6 I also support expanding public trust purposes, 
even though much of this Article’s focus concerns making the case for 
expanding the geographical scope of the doctrine. 
 During the early years of their economic development, the seven-
teen western states adopted the prior appropriation doctrine to gov-
ern their water allocation systems.7 Originating in the common law 
and later codified by the various state legislatures, the prior appro-
priation doctrine declared a “ ‘first in time, first in right’ ” policy of 
dividing the waters among competing users.8 A misconception con-
cerning the doctrine of prior appropriation is that it was comprehen-
sive and equitable and, most importantly for the purposes of this Ar-
ticle, that the doctrine’s system of water allocation was historically 
                                                                                                                     
Conflict, Yet So Much in Common: Considering the Similarities Between Western Water 
Law and the Endangered Species Act, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 29, 32-33 (2004). 
 4. E.g., Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 620 (1983); Cal. Trout, Inc. v. State Wa-
ter Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 208 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Benson, supra note 3, at 
32-33 (stating that the West is “easily the driest region of the United States”). 
 5. See infra Part II.B and accompanying text. 
 6. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (also expanding the 
public trust doctrine beyond previous applications); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of 
Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (expanding the state public trust doctrine of Cali-
fornia to the actual waters and nonnavigable tributaries and not just the water bed); Lam-
prey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139 (Minn. 1893) (advocating a broad construction of the public 
trust doctrine); Carol Necole Brown, A Time to Preserve: A Call for Formal Private-Party 
Rights in Perpetual Conservation Easements, 40 GA. L. REV. 85 (2005) [hereinafter Brown, 
A Time to Preserve] (discussing the importance and applicability of public trust principles 
to public resource conservation). 
 7. Ralph W. Johnson, Water Pollution and the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 
485, 489 (1989); e.g., Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 154 
(1935); Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 147 (Cal. 1855) (one of the earliest cases establishing 
the prior appropriation doctrine); State ex rel. State Game Comm’n v. Red River Valley Co., 
182 P.2d 421, 430 (N.M. 1945). See also infra Part II.B (discussing the history of the doc-
trine of prior appropriation). 
 8. Andreen, supra note 1, at 10. 
2006]                         DRINKING FROM A DEEP WELL 3 
 
preferred over other methods of settling competing water claims.9 
However, the prior appropriation doctrine was not intended to affect 
the scope or coverage of the public trust doctrine; rather, it was and 
still is a doctrine that caters to special interests such as development, 
mining, and agriculture.10 The prior appropriation doctrine is “a spe-
cial interest legal doctrine”11 that essentially imbues water resources 
with private property qualities similar to those traditionally associ-
ated with real property interests.12 Claims of vested rights to contin-
ued distribution levels and of entitlements to just compensation 
when government modifies water rights to the detriment of prior ap-
propriators evidence the private property perception of water that 
characterizes the prior appropriation doctrine.13 
 “[W]here a water crisis is not yet . . . so severe as to make a trans-
parent call on the popular will (as remains true in most of the United 
States), the critical nature of the stakes may translate only into in-
cremental political moves” 14 or, in the worst of cases, to a total ab-
sence of policy reformation.15 The intense need for water and its in-
creasing scarcity in the West prompt me to consider what role a more 
robust public trust doctrine might play in modifying existing water 
law concepts to better manage and conserve this essential resource.16 
                                                                                                                     
 9. Johnson, supra note 7, at 489. 
 10. E.g., Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 279-83 (1958) (describ-
ing the Central Valley Project, an estimated billion-dollar joint venture between the fed-
eral government and California for the purpose of bringing to California’s “parched acres a 
water supply sufficiently permanent to transform them . . . for the benefit of mankind”); 
Cal. Or. Power Co., 295 U.S. at 154 (discussing manufacturing as a third source of western 
states’ need for established water laws); id. at 156-57 (discussing the reclamation of valu-
able yet arid lands by western pioneers and their transformation of such lands into valu-
able farmland and plentiful orchards); Peterson v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 802-
03 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing more than a century of federal government initiatives aimed 
at the orderly development and opening of the West to settlement and agriculture using 
water as the primary instrument); Johnson, supra note 7, at 489-90.  
 11. Johnson, supra note 7, at 502. 
 12. Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 126-32 (discussing the bundle of prop-
erty rights metaphor that dominates the American understanding of the nature of entitle-
ments generally accompanying the status of ownership of private property). 
 13. See, e.g., infra notes 175-93 and accompanying text (discussing National Audubon 
Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (the Mono Lake case)); 
infra Part II.B (discussing the impropriety of applying a private property rubric to certain 
water resources because of their inherently public nature). 
 14. Cohen, supra note 1, at 1819. 
 15. Id. at 1819-20. 
 16. Melissa K. Scanlan, Opinion, We Must Protect Great Lakes Waters, WIS. ST. J., 
Aug. 13, 2005, at A8. 
Water scarcity is becoming a reality–the “oil” of the 21st century. A handful of 
multinational corporations is capitalizing on this scarcity by amassing control 
of water resources in what is now a $1 trillion industry. 
  Wisconsin had its own brush with privatization on a large scale in 2000 
when Nestle/Perrier attempted to bottle Wisconsin’s spring waters. In an in-
credible display of community concern that combined local organizing, town 
hall meetings, media outreach, state legislation and litigation, Wisconsin’s 
4  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
 
 A liberal application of the public trust doctrine decentralizes the 
use interest in western waters, thereby creating greater opportuni-
ties for: (1) public access and efficient use, (2) environmental protec-
tion, and (3) the safeguarding of recreational interests.17 Decentrali-
zation of real property and of access to real property are strong indi-
cia of a well-functioning democratic society.18 Similarly, protecting 
public rights to inherently public resources, such as water, is an im-
portant component of the process of striking the proper balance in 
“safeguard[ing] public rights along with private ones.”19 Public rights 
are just as essential to a healthy and functioning democratic society 
as are private rights, and strengthening the public trust doctrine en-
sures that public resources are not turned over to private owners, es-
sentially consolidating usufructuary interests in important waters in 
the hands of a few and to the exclusion of the public.20 
 This Article’s proposal for a more liberally applied public trust 
doctrine is consistent with my earlier proposals for private-party 
standing to enforce perpetual conservation easements and decen-
tralization of real property rights so as to facilitate the survival of 
regulatory takings claims in the context of post-regulatory acquisi-
tions of property.21 My prior articles focused on decentralization of 
                                                                                                                     
residents sent Perrier packing. But this episode exposed the lack of legal pro-
tections for water. 
Id. 
 17. E.g., Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 724 (“ ‘[T]he right of property in water is usufruc-
tuary, and consists not so much of the fluid itself as the advantage of its use.’ ”) (citation 
omitted); Capital Water Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 262 P. 863, 870 (Idaho 1926) (Lee, C.J., 
dissenting) (stating that beneficial use, but not title, is all that may be acquired by parties 
to the state’s waters); Rencken v. Young, 711 P.2d 954, 960 n.9 (Or. 1985) (stating that       
“ ‘the proprietary right [in water] is usufructuary in character’ ”) (citation omitted). 
 18. Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 126-32 (discussing decentralization of 
real property by recognizing that the public has a beneficial interest in conservation ease-
ments sufficient to confer private-party standing to enforce and defend against challenges 
to perpetual conservation easements); Carol Necole Brown, Taking the Takings Claim: A 
Policy and Economic Analysis of the Survival of Takings Claims After Property Transfers, 
36 CONN. L. REV. 7, 46-47 (2003) [hereinafter Brown, Taking the Takings Claim] (discuss-
ing decentralization of real property as essential to distributive justice in the context of the 
survival of regulatory takings claims when the regulation predates the owner’s acquisition 
of title). 
 19. Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the 
New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265, 298 (1996) [hereinafter Rose, A 
Dozen Propositions]. 
 20. Id.; Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 126-32 (discussing the decentrali-
zation of property as important for democratic systems); Brown, Taking the Takings 
Claim, supra note 18, at 34 (making the case for recognition of the takings claim itself as a 
cognizable property interest deserving of protection and resulting in an expanded notion of 
private property). 
 21. Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6; Brown, Taking the Takings Claim, supra 
note 18. 
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real property,22 and I contend that the same basic concepts apply to 
water rights.23  
 Changing times and conditions necessitate a thoughtful dialogue 
about the appropriate scope of the public trust doctrine. Strong 
precedent exists for continued reconsideration and broadening of the 
public trust doctrine’s reach.24  In the past, “the prior appropriation 
doctrine and the public trust doctrine operated entirely independent 
of each other. They are now being brought into contact, and con-
flict.”25 It is time for a change in paradigm. 
 In Part II of this Article, I explore two possible approaches to the 
water scarcity problem. Suggestions for how best to ensure reason-
able public access to water are as limitless as the number of potential 
appropriators, landowners, and interested environmentalists. This 
Article considers only two of the many options. The first approach is 
to decentralize water use entitlements through strengthening and 
expanding the public trust doctrine. I illustrate the potential benefits 
of a more robust public trust doctrine using two compelling cases 
that each attempt to strike the balance between private-party expec-
tations and public rights to water. The second approach is to adhere 
even more strictly to the prior appropriation doctrine. I discuss 
why this approach is a lesser alternative to rethinking the public 
trust doctrine. 
 Next, in Part III I discuss possible implications arising from the 
approaches discussed in Part II. One implication concerns the decen-
tralizing effect of an expanded public trust doctrine—specifically, its 
impact on regulatory takings claims26 and the related problem of 
                                                                                                                     
 22. Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 126-32; Brown, Taking the Takings 
Claim, supra note 18. 
 23. See infra Part III.A. 
 24. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484-85 (1988) (expanding the 
reach of the public trust doctrine). For a discussion of expansion of the reach of the public 
trust doctrine by modern courts, see Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 143-47; 
Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Prop-
erty, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986) [hereinafter Rose, Comedy]; Charles F. Wilkinson, The 
Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional 
Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 453-69 (1989); see also David L. Callies & Benjamin A. Kudo, 
Address at the Midyear Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, The Idea of 
Property: Custom and Public Trust (June 17, 2004) (available at 
http://aalsweb.aals.org/midyear2004/callies.pdf) (for selected state cases discussing recent 
expansions and refusals to expand the public trust doctrine). 
 25. Johnson, supra note 7, at 504; see also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 552 
(1963); Scanlan, supra note 16. An important moment of change in this historic separation 
occurred in the 1980s in California with the Mono Lake decision. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. 
Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). 
 26. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).  
“Taking” is, of course, constitutional law’s expression for any sort of publicly in-
flicted private injury for which the Constitution requires payment of compensa-
tion. Whether a particular injurious result of governmental activity is to be 
6  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
 
vested rights. The other implication considers whether the real prop-
erty conservation easement framework should be applied to create 
similar conservation easements in water resources. 
 Part IV concludes by reiterating the importance of undertaking 
sometimes difficult transitions when faced with an ever-dynamic and 
changing environment. 
II.   GREATER OPPORTUNITIES FOR PUBLIC ACCESS AND MORE 
EFFICIENT USE OF WESTERN WATER RESOURCES 
A.   Addressing Water Shortages Using the Public Trust Doctrine 
1.   General Proposal 
 The public trust doctrine is “perhaps the single most controversial 
development in natural resources law.”27 The theory underlying the 
traditional federal public trust doctrine is that the navigable waters28 
of the United States are held in perpetual trust by the states29 for the 
continual use of the public.30 The public trust doctrine exists on two 
                                                                                                                     
classed as a “taking” is a question which usually arises where the nature of the 
activity and its causation of private loss are not themselves disputed; and so a 
court assigned to differentiate among impacts which are and are not “takings” 
is essentially engaged in deciding when government may execute public pro-
grams while leaving associated costs disproportionately concentrated upon one 
or a few persons. 
Id. at 1165. 
 27. Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 426. 
 28. See infra Part II.A.1 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of navigable 
waters); see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979)  (“[C]ongressional 
authority over the waters of this Nation does not depend on a stream’s ‘navigability.’ . . . 
[A] wide spectrum of economic activities ‘affect’ [sic] interstate commerce and thus are sus-
ceptible of congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause irrespective of whether 
navigation, or, indeed, water, is involved.”). 
 29. See Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163-64 
(1935) (discussing nonnavigable waters and establishing that state law governs the acqui-
sition of water rights); see also Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 123-24 (1983) (citing 
California Oregon Power Co., 295 U.S. at 162, for the same proposition above); Martin v. 
Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842) (discussing navigable waters as subject to the 
sovereign authority of the states as of the American Revolution); Golden Feather Cmty. 
Ass’n v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836, 841 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (discuss-
ing navigable waters and stating that the state of California holds lands subject to naviga-
ble waters “in its sovereign capacity in trust for the public purposes of navigation and fish-
ery, and a public easement and servitude exists for these purposes”); Galt v. State, 731 
P.2d 912, 914-15 (Mont. 1987) (discussing the state of Montana as trustee under the public 
trust doctrine of, among other things, the waters in navigable streams and lakes); State ex 
rel. State Game Comm’n v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421, 463-64 (N.M. 1945) (“[T]he 
public has a prima facie right to fish in all navigable streams, just as it has in other public 
waters . . . .”); Craig Anthony Arnold, Is Wet Growth Smarter than Smart Growth?: The 
Fragmentation and Integration of Land Use and Water, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10152, 10164 
(2005) (“Water use is largely a matter of long-standing state common-law doctrines of prop-
erty rights . . . .”).  
 30. Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 426-27 (“By the traditional doctrine, I mean the trust 
principles that the United States Supreme Court has applied to those watercourses that 
are navigable for the purposes of title—those watercourses whose shorelines, beds, and 
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levels: there is the federal public trust doctrine and there are the 
varying public trust doctrines of the fifty states.31 Federal law has 
historically deferred to state law expressions of the nature, extent, 
and content of public and private rights to waters within the bounda-
ries of the individual states.32 
 The United States Supreme Court first articulated the federal 
public trust doctrine in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois.33 The 
Court’s description of the state’s public trust power and authority 
clearly established that both derived from federal law.34 As an exam-
ple, the Court declared that no state has the authority to contract for 
the conveyance of property in violation of the public trust and any 
state legislation purporting to allow such a contract would be inoper-
able.35 The federal public trust doctrine typically follows state title 
and is useful for the rather limited purposes of protecting the use of 
and access to navigable waters.36 Navigability is a critical term be-
cause under the traditional federal public trust doctrine, only navi-
gable waters were subject to the doctrine and therein safeguarded 
against private appropriation for the public benefit.37 Navigable wa-
ters are characterized by a public right of use which finds expression 
in the public trust doctrine. 
 States have considerable discretion in how they interpret the pub-
lic trust doctrine; federal law serves as a baseline for the states, and 
they are “prohibited from abrogating the public trust entirely.”38 In 
response to changed conditions, many state courts and legislatures39 
                                                                                                                     
banks pass by implication to states at the time of statehood.”) (citations omitted). For a 
discussion of the history and principles underlying the public trust doctrine, see Joseph L. 
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 
68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1969) [hereinafter Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine]; Joseph L. Sax, 
Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
185 (1980) [hereinafter Sax, Liberating the Public Trust].  
 31. Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 425; Robin Kundis Craig, Beyond SWANCC: The 
New Federalism and Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, 33 ENVTL. L. 113, 119 n.45 (2003) (dis-
cussing the federal public trust doctrine). 
 32. Cohen, supra note 1, at 1846. 
 33. 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 453-54. 
 34. See, e.g., Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 435, 453 (declaring that states are prohibited 
from acting in disregard of their public trust duties); New York v. DeLyser, 759 F. Supp. 
982, 990 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The Illinois Central case . . . involved a fundamental issue of 
federal law concerning the nature of a state’s sovereignty, and the powers assumed by a 
state upon its admission to the Union.”); Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 453-54 (“Illinois Cen-
tral, however, seems plainly to have been premised on federal law. . . . In describing the 
trust, the Court made it clear that the trust derives from federal law and is binding on all 
states . . . .”). 
 35. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 460. 
 36. Craig, supra note 31, at 119 n.45; Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 461-64. 
 37. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 8:4 (2005). 
 38. Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 464. 
 39. State ex rel. Brown v. Newport Concrete Co., 336 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1975) (stating that the public trust doctrine “is a philosophy which has grown rapidly 
among . . . natural resource legal advocates, and has been accepted with greater breadth by 
8  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
 
have gradually expanded the doctrine.40 Although the public trust 
doctrine originated with the judiciary and for a long while developed 
in a somewhat haphazard fashion due to the uncertainties of litiga-
tion,41 over time the states began expressing the public trust doctrine 
in their state constitutions and statutes.42 Initially, the doctrine in-
cluded only the tidelands under navigable waters43 and for the bene-
fit of navigation and fishing.44 Some states have broadened the public 
trust doctrine to include certain nonnavigable tributaries,45 nonnavi-
gable streams that support established public trust interests,46 state 
groundwaters,47 various recreational and ecological needs,48 drinking 
                                                                                                                     
. . . courts . . . .” Id.); Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 351 (1998) [hereinafter Rose, Joseph Sax]; Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine, 
supra note 30, at 509-46 (discussing the propriety of leaving control of the public trust doc-
trine with the judiciary rather than the legislature). 
 40. Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 143-47; Callies & Kudo, supra note 24; 
Michael Booth, Public’s Access to Private Beach is Upheld, Subject to Reasonable Fees, 181 
N.J. L.J. 382 (2005).  
  The justices extended the “public trust doctrine”—under which “submerged 
lands and waters below mean highwater mark are owned by the state govern-
ment in trust for public uses such as transportation and fishing”—to upland 
beach areas that are a necessary adjunct to bathers’ enjoyment of the ocean.  
  . . . . 
  The ruling expands on a 1984 case, Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement As-
sociation, 95 N.J. 306, that said the public must be afforded “reasonable access 
to the foreshore” but that did not address what could be done with the vast 
tracts of dry sand that are privately owned. 
 Id.; Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 461-64. 
 41. Terry W. Frazier, The Green Alternative to Classical Liberal Property Theory, 20 
VT. L. REV. 299, 354-57 (1995). 
 42. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4 (2005) (codifying California public trust doctrine); 
HAW. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 7 (2005); MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (2005); PA. CONST. art. I, § 
27 (2005); WASH. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (2005); WIS. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (2005); CAL. PUB. 
RES. CODE § 6307 (West 2005) (stating that California’s State Lands Commission was en-
trusted by the California Constitution to protect the state’s interests in designated waters 
and lands as public trust lands); COL. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102 (2005) (discussing basic ten-
ets of Colorado water law); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.32501 et seq. (2005) (codifying the 
Great Lakes Submerged Lands Act (GLSLA). The GLSLA “reiterates the state’s authority 
as trustee of the inalienable jus publicum, which extends over both publicly and privately 
owned lands.” Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 67 (Mich. 2005)). 
 43. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458 (1892); see also Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 182 (1979) (developing three distinct tests for navigability: 
“ ‘navigability in fact,’ ‘navigable capacity,’ and ‘ebb and flow’ of the tide”). For an interest-
ing history of these tests and of the question of navigability in general to the public trust 
doctrine, see id. at 182-87; Webb v. Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 82 (Cal. 1913) (“It is a well-
established proposition that the lands lying between the lines of ordinary high and low 
tide, as well as that within a bay or harbor, and permanently covered by its waters, belong 
to the state in its sovereign character, and are held in trust for the public purposes of navi-
gation and fishery.”). 
 44. Golden Feather Cmty. Ass’n v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836, 841 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
 45. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal. 1983). 
 46. Golden Feather, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 843. 
 47. Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 108 (1999). 
 48. Esplanade Properties, L.L.C. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(precluding shoreline residential development because of its detrimental impact on recrea-
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water,49 and even “the area of appropriation of water.”50 These sus-
tained extensions demonstrate the dynamic nature of the public 
trust doctrine. 
 Joseph Sax eloquently expressed the essential benefits attending 
the public trust doctrine and, relatedly, its expansion when he stated 
the following: 
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of 
the general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism 
upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either to real-
locate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject public 
uses to the self-interest of private parties.51 
The heightened protection of water resources that attends broader 
application of the public trust doctrine could help slow the over-
appropriation of vital waters, reacquire instream flows52 of such wa-
ters, and increase water conservation efforts.53 
 My suggestion of an expanded and more robust public trust doc-
trine is neither novel nor new. Several state courts have held or sug-
gested “that water rights obtained under the prior appropriation doc-
trine might be curtailed if such appropriations substantially impair 
[certain] watercourses.”54 Harry Bader noted more than a decade ago 
that the development of a broader and more aggressive public trust 
doctrine is one component of an environmental law policy substan-
tive enough to possibly serve as what he termed “an affirmative in-
strument for ecological protection.”55 He rightly observed that a pub-
                                                                                                                     
tional needs of the public); Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 719 (“The principal values plaintiffs 
seek to protect . . . are recreational and ecological–the scenic views of the lake and its 
shore, the purity of the air, and the use of the lake for nesting and feeding by birds. [I]t is 
clear that protection of these values is among the purposes of the public trust.”) (citation 
omitted); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 369 (N.J. 1984) (stat-
ing that the public trust doctrine was broad enough to protect, for the public, purposes 
such as swimming, bathing, and shore activities); R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 628 N.W.2d 
781, 788 (Wis. 2001) (including recreation and scenic beauty preservation within the scope 
of the public trust doctrine). 
 49. Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 466. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 30, at 490 (discussing the holding in Il-
linois Central).   
 52. “Instream flow protection refers to ‘the legal, physical, contractual, and/or admin-
istrative methods that have been used to ensure that enough water remains in streams to 
sustain instream [flows].’ ” Mary Ann King, Getting Our Feet Wet: An Introduction to Water 
Trusts, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 495, 502 (2004) (alteration in original). 
 53. WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 133 (2d ed. 1988). 
 54. Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 466 (discussing states that have extended the public 
trust doctrine to water rights obtained through beneficial use under the prior appropria-
tion doctrine); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) 
(the Mono Lake case, infra notes 175-93 and accompanying text). 
 55. Harry R. Bader, Antaeus and the Public Trust Doctrine: A New Approach to Sub-
stantive Environmental Protection in the Common Law, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 749, 
750 (1992). 
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lic trust doctrine with the limited function of merely guaranteeing 
public access to America’s fish, wildlife, and water resources is a 
vacuous doctrine indeed.56  What good do citizens reap from access to 
important waters if, through diversions—such as in the case of Mono 
Lake,57 discussed in greater detail below—the water resource is 
threatened with degradation and atrophy and if dependent animal 
and plant species are imperiled?58 Recent changes in ecology and en-
hanced environmental protection tools to protect real property, such 
as perpetual conservation easements,59 support the ideas expressed 
by Bader then and by this author now.60  
 Broadening the public trust doctrine creates the appropriate 
amount of diffusion or decentralization of power while simultane-
ously using the institution of government to maintain economic and 
social stability. As the public trust doctrine grows to protect more ex-
tensive water sources for public use, the decentralization of power 
“promotes justice by recognizing the dignity and equal worth of each 
individual. It promotes the utilitarian goal of maximizing human sat-
isfaction by creating the conditions necessary for economic efficiency 
and social welfare. These justice and utilitarian goals often go to-
gether.”61 Government, the administrator of the public trust, ensures 
that property and the power accompanying it are not too diffuse be-
cause excessive diffusion risks giving rise to anarchy.62 
 One consequence of expanding the public trust doctrine is the po-
tentially unsettling effect it could have on the rights and expecta-
tions of those claiming vested rights in water resources that are 
                                                                                                                     
 56. Id. at 750. 
 57. See infra notes 175-93 and accompanying text. 
 58. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d  at 711.  
As a result of these diversions [from four of the five streams feeding Mono 
Lake], the level of the lake has dropped; the surface area has diminished by 
one-third; one of the two principal islands in the lake has become a peninsula, 
exposing the gull rookery there to coyotes and other predators and causing the 
gulls to abandon the former island. The ultimate effect of continued diversions 
is a matter of intense dispute, but there seems little doubt that both the scenic 
beauty and the ecological values of Mono Lake are imperiled. 
Id.; see also Bader, supra note 55, at 750; Frazier, supra note 41, at 356. 
 59. E.g., Bader, supra note 55, at 749 (generally discussing changed ecological condi-
tions in the context of Alaska’s wilderness); Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 
101-12 (discussing the value of citizen suits, also known as private-party standing, to en-
force perpetual conservation easements as created by the Uniform Conservation Easement 
Act); Frazier, supra note 41, at 356.  
 60. Bader, supra note 55, at 749. 
 61. Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 126 n.188 (citing JOSEPH WILLIAM 
SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 144 (2000)); Carol M. Rose, Property 
as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 344-45 (1996) [hereinafter Rose, Prop-
erty as a Keystone Right]. 
 62. Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 126-32 (discussing the importance of 
decentralization in the context of private property); Rose, Property as a Keystone Right, su-
pra note 61, at 344-45. 
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presently treated as exempt from the public trust doctrine.63 Expan-
sion of the public trust doctrine does not abrogate the property pro-
tections established by the various states to the extent of additional 
value added to nonvested usufructuary rights.64 “Despite the public 
trust doctrine’s potential power, courts generally have tried to ac-
commodate it within our dominant private property rights regime.”65 
For instance, the private property protections afforded citizens under 
the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause66 are not abrogated by the 
                                                                                                                     
 63. E.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005) (stating that public 
use should also be understood to include public purpose for purposes of justifying use of the 
state takings power); City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 52 P.2d 585, 586 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935) 
(considering if a municipality’s exercise of the power of eminent domain to condemn pri-
vate property owners’ littoral rights to a navigable lake constituted a compensable event 
under the state constitution). 
 64. E.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 172 (1979) (stating that even 
though Kaupa Pond fell “within the definition of ‘navigable waters’ as this Court has used 
that term in delimiting the boundaries of Congress’ regulatory authority under the Com-
merce Clause, this Court has never held that the navigational servitude creates a blanket 
exception to the Takings Clause”) (citations omitted); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 
387, 455 (1892) (stating the Illinois Central Railroad would be entitled to compensation 
from the state of Illinois to the extent of its investment in submerged lands waters that 
were alienated to the railroad by the state of Illinois in violation of its public trust respon-
sibilities); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 723 n.22 (Cal. 
1983) (rejecting a claim that establishment of the public trust constituted a compensable 
taking of property but holding that the state could not appropriate improvements on the 
affected lands in this particular case without paying compensation).  
 65. Michael C. Blumm et al., Renouncing the Public Trust Doctrine: An Assessment of 
the Validity of Idaho House Bill 794, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 461, 465 (1997); Rose, A Dozen 
Propositions, supra note 19, at 285-87. 
For example, takings and due process considerations typically have required 
that pre-existing uses be “grandfathered” into new legislation aimed at protect-
ing public rights. . . . [I]n state property jurisprudence, there is much attention 
to what are called the “vested rights” of private property owners to continue 
land development projects, even when the projects are inconsistent with recent 
legislative change. The much-used phrase in federal takings jurisprudence, 
“investment-backed expectations,” aims to identify and, if necessary, to indem-
nify the property owners who may suffer particularly pointed losses, even from 
legislation that is otherwise a reasonable effort to protect public rights. 
  These judicial techniques are compromises, or rather, they are all the same 
compromise. The compromise aims at protecting settled expectations, avoiding 
the demoralizing of private owners who can establish their settled expecta-
tions, and preventing the deadweight loss of pre-existing capital investments 
taken in good faith. Those are the aims with respect to regulated individuals. 
  But the other aims of the compromise are public: to stave off private eva-
sions that might destroy resources important to the public; to permit legisla-
tures, over time, to adjust the protections necessary for the preservation of pub-
lic rights and resources; and to obviate the need to compensate owners beyond a 
point at which those owners should reasonably be expected to adjust their own 
expectations about what they can and cannot do on their properties.  
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 66. GOLDFARB, supra note 53, at 133. Some argue that not only is the public trust doc-
trine necessary for the maintenance of important waters but that if anyone is entitled to 
compensation under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, it is “the general public–
deprived for so long of its recreational and environmental rights.” Id. 
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renewal of the public trust doctrine.67 In Illinois Central Railroad Co. 
v. Illinois,68 the Supreme Court held that the State of Illinois was 
neither free to alienate its navigable waters nor abdicate its public 
trust responsibilities over such waters in a manner that was incon-
sistent with its public trust duties.69 Importantly, the Court acknowl-
edged that if Illinois Central Railroad could demonstrate that it 
made valuable improvements during the period between the state’s 
grant of the land to the railroad and its subsequent repeal of the 
grant, the state would not be able to appropriate the land without 
compensating the railroad for the value of its investment.70  
 Thus, citizens would retain their rights to pursue takings chal-
lenges in the face of state action redefining the scope of the public 
trust doctrine.71 The traditional doctrines that protect citizens in 
their properly vested rights in private property would be undisturbed 
by a more expansive construction of the public trust doctrine.72 Ex-
tension of the public trust doctrine, though, does not entitle water 
rights holders to compensation, per se.73 Federal and state govern-
                                                                                                                     
 67. See, e.g., infra notes 76-108 and accompanying text (discussing the public trust 
doctrine and takings claims). 
 68. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
 69. Id. at 456. The Court stated, 
The trust devolving upon the State for the public, and which can only be dis-
charged by the management and control of property in which the public has an 
interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property. The control of the 
State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels 
as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed 
of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and 
waters remaining. . . . 
  . . . . 
  This follows necessarily from the public character of the property, being held 
by the whole people for purposes in which the whole people are interested.  
Id. at 453, 456. See also Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 145-47 (discussing Il-
linois Central). For a more recent example of the protections afforded private property 
rights within a more aggressive public trust regime, see United States v. Aetna, 408 F. 
Supp. 42 (D. Haw. 1976), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 584 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1978), rev’d, 444 
U.S. 164 (1979). 
 70. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 455 (“Undoubtedly there may be expenses incurred in 
improvements made under such a grant, which the state ought to pay; but, be that as it 
may, the power to resume the trust whenever the state judges best is, we think, incontro-
vertible.”) A modern example of a type of compensable improvement includes improving 
water quality for the purpose of repopulating bodies of water with aquatic wildlife and 
other types of endangered species.  
 71. See, e.g., Brown, Taking the Takings Claim, supra note 18 (discussing takings 
challenges in the context of the notice rule). 
 72. Of course, when property is deemed commons property and no vested rights have 
attached, citizens should not be able to succeed on takings challenges. See, e.g., Janet C. 
Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in 
Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 973 (1998) (“Water is a common resource; this is why 
nearly all of the western states declare it to be a public resource.”).  
 73. For an in-depth discussion of the intersection between takings jurisprudence and 
an expanded public trust doctrine, see John D. Leshy, A Conversation About Takings and 
Water Rights, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1985 (2005); see also Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 
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ments that articulate a historical understanding of the public trust 
doctrine as broad and expansive will prove to be difficult venues for 
citizens bringing these types of private takings claims.74 This asser-
tion would be particularly powerful in jurisdictions which find that  
[when dealing with] weak and tenuous property right[s]–and, at 
the least, all of the surface water’s usufruct[ua]ry rights are in-
tended to count as such–what is prima facie reasonable is the ex-
pectation that your use-right could get diminished or supplanted 
at any time for any reason that a governmental entity agency 
takes to be a paramount claim.75  
 The recent United States Supreme Court case Kelo v. City of New 
London76 exemplifies a similar type of judicial understanding in the 
regulatory takings context.77 The Kelo Court granted certiorari to de-
termine whether the public use clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution permitted the exercise of eminent domain 
for the primary purpose of promoting economic development.78 
 In 2000, the city of New London, Connecticut, approved a plan of 
development that “was ‘projected to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to 
increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an economically 
distressed city.’ ”79 New London approved the purchase of property 
from willing sellers and the exercise of the power of eminent domain 
to acquire the property of unwilling sellers in exchange for the pay-
                                                                                                                     
2655 (2005). The Court held that its finding that the Fifth Amendment’s public use provi-
sion was broad enough to encompass economic development takings did not give rise to an 
entitlement to just compensation in the case before it. The Court acknowledged that, ini-
tially, the public use requirement had been applied broadly but then found that over time, 
courts “embraced the broader and more natural interpretation” of the term, which was 
warranted by the changing nature of the public’s needs, evolving over time and in different 
ways in different parts of the nation. Id. at 2662, 2664. 
 74. See, e.g., Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662 (affirming a broad interpretation of the “public 
use” restriction of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause as consistent with “public purpose”). 
 75. Cohen, supra note 1, at 1858. “The proposition under advancement is that gov-
ernment should not bear the cost of direct compensation whenever, acting to protect a wa-
ter resource or to satisfy any other related mandate, it strips the holder of a water right of 
the water itself. The dent that this might cause to the value of otherwise marketable water 
rights is taken to be an unobjectionable result of the collision between market forces and 
the public’s preemptive will . . . .” Id. at 1837. See Leshy, supra note 73. 
 76. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
 77. Id. For an in-depth discussion of the Kelo decision, representing thoughtful and 
diverse viewpoints, see Poletown Overruled:  Recent Michigan Case Tightens the Reins on 
the Public Use Requirement, PROB. & PROP., Mar./Apr. 2005, at 10-19  (containing numer-
ous articles commenting on the Fifth Amendment’s public use requirement and the Kelo 
decision). 
 78. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661. 
 79. Id. at 2658 (quoting the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Kelo v. City of New Lon-
don, 843 A.2d 500, 507 (Conn. 2004), cert. granted, 542 U.S. 965 (2004)). Respondent New 
London Development Corporation, a private nonprofit entity, was reactivated to implement 
the development project, having been established years earlier to help the city of New Lon-
don with economic development planning. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658-59. 
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ment of just compensation.80 The petitioners sued New London, one 
of their claims being that New London’s exercise of its eminent do-
main powers to condemn and acquire their properties violated the 
public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.81 For the petition-
ers, the egregiousness of the proposed condemnation was worsened 
because, pursuant to the development plan, their private properties 
would be transferred to another private owner and for primarily pri-
vate benefit, with only the potential for incidental public benefits 
flowing to the public.82 The petitioners urged the Court to find that 
“economic development [did] not qualify as a public use.”83  
 The Superior Court of Connecticut granted a permanent restrain-
ing order against New London prohibiting the taking of properties lo-
cated within the park and marina support areas of the development 
plan.84 However, the court denied relief to petitioners as to those 
properties located within the area designated for office space.85 Both 
sides appealed the superior court’s  decision to the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut, which reversed the superior court’s ruling in favor of 
the petitioners (granting a restraining order as to the park and ma-
rina support areas) and affirmed the superior court’s ruling in favor 
of New London.86 
 In disposing of the case, the United States Supreme Court framed 
the question before it as whether the development plan served a pub-
lic purpose recognizable under the Fifth Amendment.87 The Court 
traced its application of the public use exception back to the nine-
teenth century and discussed the naturally changing and evolving 
nature of how state and federal courts have interpreted the public 
use test.88 The Court applied seminal cases from the past and charac-
terized the dynamic nature of the public use requirement as follows: 
                                                                                                                     
 80. Id. at 2658.   
 81. There were nine petitioners owning a total of fifteen properties located in the tar-
geted development area. Id. at 2660. 
 82. Id. at 2675 (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia and Tho-
mas, JJ.). The New London Development Corporation was approved by New London to 
carry out the development plan. The corporation is a private, nonprofit corporation. At one 
point during the litigation, the New London Development Corporation was engaging in ne-
gotiations with a private developer, Corcoran Jennison, for a ninety-nine-year ground lease 
for one dollar per year in rent. Id. at 2660 n.4. While Petitioners also contended that the 
primary purpose of New London’s proposal was to benefit the Pfizer company, Connecticut 
Superior and Supreme Courts disagreed and found that New London’s “development plan 
was intended to revitalize the local economy, not to serve the interests of Pfizer, Corcoran 
Jennison, or any other private party.” Id. at 2669-70 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 83. Id. at 2665. 
 84. Id. at 2660. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 2660-61. 
 87. Id. at 2663.  
 88. Id. at 2662-64.  
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[W]hile many state courts in the mid-19th century endorsed 
“use by the public” as the proper definition of public use, that 
narrow view steadily eroded over time. Not only was the “use by 
the public” test difficult to administer . . . but it proved to be 
impractical given the diverse and always evolving needs of soci-
ety. Accordingly, when this Court began applying the Fifth 
Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th century, it 
embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public 
use as “public purpose.” . . . 
 . . . . 
 Viewed as a whole, our jurisprudence has recognized that the 
needs of society have varied between different parts of the Nation, 
just as they have evolved over time in response to changed circum-
stances. Our earliest cases in particular embodied a strong theme 
of federalism, emphasizing the “great respect” that we owe to state 
legislatures and state courts in discerning local public needs.89 
 The Kelo Court articulated a “traditionally broad understanding 
of public purpose”90 and simultaneously acknowledged the dynamic 
nature of the public interest. It also emphasized its deference to the 
states’ legislative and judicial decisionmaking pertaining to safe-
guarding the public.91 The Court expressly held that the individual 
states retained authority to impose public use restrictions that were 
more stringent than those of the federal government.92 
 These same principles apply to the inherently public nature of 
state water resources, the states’ nondelegable responsibility to safe-
guard these public resources, and the important role of the public 
trust doctrine as a tool to aid states in meeting their obligations.  
 Relatedly, Carol Rose noted a decade ago in her seminal work A 
Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New 
Takings Legislation93 that courts are often attracted to the public 
trust doctrine as a means of protecting public rights in resources im-
bued with public attributes because some legislatures place public 
rights in a precarious position.94 Professor Rose stated that public 
choice literature makes the case that legislatures can be vulnerable 
and highly sensitive to the concentrated and intense bargaining ad-
vantages of special interest groups.95 This literature indicates that 
legislatures are likely to favor well-funded and organized developers 
of natural resources particularly when their opposition tends to be 
                                                                                                                     
 89. Id. at 2662, 2664. 
 90. Id. at 2666. 
 91. Id. at 2664. 
 92. Id. at 2668. 
 93. Rose, A Dozen Propositions, supra note 19. 
 94. Id. at 294. 
 95. Id. 
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“large [and] diffuse.”96 Once special interests successfully target legis-
lators and acquire usufructuary entitlements for their constituents, 
what Professor Rose calls the “ ‘endowment effect’ ” potentially 
arises.97 The endowment effect simply describes the phenomenon 
which holds that people place greater value on entitlements they ac-
tually possess than entitlements they might possess in the future.98 
This ranking of preferences suggests that once the legislature has 
transferred away public rights, these transfers are particularly diffi-
cult to reverse.99 Judicial use of the public trust doctrine may help 
protect against unwarranted diminutions in public rights through 
excessive privatization of public resources.100 
 States retain the authority to interpret the public trust doctrine 
more broadly than the federal public trust doctrine.101 “[W]ater rights 
have always had some elements of communal management and re-
sponsiveness to change ‘built in’ . . . . [W]ater’s development, use, and 
transfer unambiguously implicate many other users and types of use, 
and thus the legal regimes for water rights have tended to evolve in 
such ways as to incorporate greater concern for diversity and 
changes in use.”102 An evolving, broader notion of the public trust is 
consistent with the sensitivity to changed conditions that has histori-
cally attended water law. Changed conditions warrant the continued 
monitoring and adjustment of water management and access; modifi-
cation of the public trust doctrine’s scope is one means of achieving 
this end. 
 The public trust doctrine, applied responsibly and more expan-
sively, promises to be a useful tool in the effort to better prioritize 
                                                                                                                     
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.  at 294-95 (citation omitted). 
 98. Id. at 294. 
 99. Id.; see also Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 118-19 (discussing the 
“endowment effect” but in the context of efficiency gains attending the negotiation of per-
petual conservation easements contrasted with government-forced transfers of conserva-
tion interests by the power of eminent domain). “[P]roperty owners generally demand more 
in the way of compensation when asked to surrender an entitlement already in their pos-
session than they would be willing to pay to acquire the very same entitlement had it not 
been originally assigned to them.” Id. at 118 (citations omitted). While referring to a differ-
ent type of property interest and within a different context (private parties versus the gov-
ernment), my observations in the context of conservation easements are consistent with 
Professor Rose’s observations of the different dynamics attending legislative versus judicial 
decisions in regards to allocating natural resources, the public commons. 
 100. Rose, A Dozen Propositions, supra note 19, at 294.  Professor Rose also provides a 
thoughtful discussion of the helpful role legislatures play in protecting public rights and 
public resources. Id. at 295-97; see also supra Part II and accompanying text, in which this 
author also acknowledges the beneficial role of legislatures, historically, in protecting en-
dangered species and conserving public resources. 
 101. See supra Part II and accompanying text; see also Kelo v. City of New London, 125 
S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005) (stating the same in the context of the Fifth Amendment’s public 
use requirement and the state exercise of the power of eminent domain). 
 102. Rose, Joseph Sax, supra note 39, at 354. 
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water uses. The public trust power implies the power not only to re-
actively protect resources but to also proactively respond to changing 
societal conditions before crisis situations arise.103 Public access to 
adequate water supplies is necessary for the creation of sustainable 
communities and the promotion of citizenship.104 Responsible public 
management of water resources furthers good stewardship of an es-
sential natural resource and of the global environment.105 
 The public trust doctrine offers a flexible approach to the water 
shortage dilemma.106 The doctrine facilitates dialogue concerning 
why various parties want usufructuary rights to valuable water re-
sources and what are the best and highest uses of limited water re-
serves.107 Thus, the public trust doctrine offers solutions for the often 
competing needs of government, landowners, environmentalists, and 
other groups.108 
2.   An Analysis of the Effect of a More Robust Public Trust 
Doctrine on Existing Water Disputes 
 A general assertion that the public trust doctrine should be ex-
panded is made more compelling by reviewing express examples of 
the types of waters, currently unprotected by the public trust doc-
trine, that would be covered under the expanded doctrine. Also, it is 
helpful to ask the question: What public benefits would be created by 
the inclusion of such waters within the public trust? The following 
examples are intended to illustrate the benefits inherent in an ex-
panded public trust doctrine. 
                                                                                                                     
 103. See, e.g., In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 501 n.107 (Haw. 2000) 
(citing Standing Comm. Rep. No. 77, 1 PROC. OF THE CONST. CONVENTION OF HAW. OF 1978 
688 (1980).  
 104. See, e.g., Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 126-32 (discussing the im-
portant role of decentralization of property ownership and of access to property in a democ-
ratic society and noting its importance to sustaining complex social relationships). 
 105. See, e.g., id. at 100-12, 126-32 (discussing the importance of decentralization of 
real property ownership and access to conservation and preservation of scarce resources). 
 106. See infra Part III and accompanying text. 
 107. See, e.g., Rose, Joseph Sax, supra note 39 (discussing the public trust doctrine as 
important in the discussion of water law and “its long history of public management and 
readjustment[ ].” Id. at 354). 
 108. Neuman, supra note 72, at 976-96; Carol M. Rose, Environmental Lessons, 27 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1023, 1043 n.7 (1994). Professor Rose observes that property rhetoric can 
be used to allocate the costs associated with the use of the waters which she describes as 
property belonging “to all of us.” Id. at 1043. See also Frank J. Trelease, Government Own-
ership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAL. L. REV. 638 (1957) (discussing the interest of vari-
ous stakeholders, including environmentalists, in the continuing debate over who owns the 
waters). 
18  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
 
 (a)   Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States109 
 The plaintiffs in Tulare alleged that the federal government took 
their contractually conferred usufructuary rights in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause110 when it restricted their water 
use pursuant to the Endangered Species Act.111 Plaintiffs, traditional 
water users, were successful in arguing that the environmental re-
strictions imposed on their water use constituted a physical occupa-
tion112 of their private property resulting in a per se taking under the 
Fifth Amendment and thus requiring just compensation.113 
 The Tulare plaintiffs’ contractual agreements with California’s 
Department of Water Resources (DWR), the actual water permit 
holder,114 entitled them to specified water allotments during the 
1992-94 irrigation seasons.115 Earlier, Congress passed the Endan-
gered Species Act116 (ESA), which was designed to remedy species ex-
tinction.117 Pursuant to its duties under the ESA, the National Ma-
rine Fisheries Service (NMFS) issued a biological opinion concluding 
that continued operation of the State Water Project (SWP) and of the 
Central Valley Project118 (CVP) under existing conditions would en-
danger the existence of the winter-run Chinook salmon.119 The U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service also identified the delta smelt as being at 
                                                                                                                     
 109. 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001). For an in-depth summary of the Tulare case, see Melinda 
Harm Benson, The Tulare Case: Water Rights, The Endangered Species Act, and the Fifth 
Amendment, 32 ENVTL. L. 551 (2002). Defendants asserted California state public trust 
doctrine as the source of their right to restrain and limit the extent of the plaintiffs’ prop-
erty interest. Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 321-22. 
 110. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation”). 
 111. Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 314.  
 112. Robert H. Freilich, Time, Space, and Value in Inverse Condemnation: A Unified 
Theory for Partial Takings Analysis, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 589, 589 (2002) (“[A] physical tak-
ing constitutes actual physical intrusion or regulations mandating that owners make 
physical improvements to property . . . .”) (citations omitted).  
 113. For a discussion of the various types of takings, see Brown, Taking the Takings 
Claim, supra note 18. 
 114. Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 315. 
 115. Id. 
 116. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994). 
 117. Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 315. 
 118. The SWP and CVP are water systems built to facilitate the transportation of wa-
ter from northern California, a water-rich area, to more arid parts of the state. Id. at 314. 
 119. The U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the NMFS determined that this species 
of fish was in danger of extinction. Id. at 314-15. The winter-run Chinook salmon were 
listed as endangered in 1994. Earthjustice Press Release, Delta Water Export Pumps 
Killing Two  Protected  Fish  Species,  http://www.earthjustice.org/news/press/2002/ 
delta_water_export_pumps_killing_two_protected_fish_species.html (Jan. 11, 2002) (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Earthjustice Press Release]. The next year, the NMFS is-
sued a second biological opinion in which it again found the winter-run Chinook salmon 
jeopardized by state and federal water export pumps. Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 315. 
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risk in its own biological opinion.120 As a result of these findings, wa-
ter that the DWR otherwise would have made available for distribu-
tion was no longer available.121  
 The court found that the plaintiffs’ contract with DWR entitled 
them to exclusive use of the amount of water prescribed in their con-
tracts.122 The court determined that the plaintiffs’ contractual rights 
were superior to all competing interests123 and held “that the federal 
government, by preventing plaintiffs from using the water to 
which they would otherwise have been entitled, . . . rendered the 
usufructuary right to that water valueless, [thus effecting] a 
physical taking.”124 
 The defendant responded by asserting the public trust doctrine as 
a limitation on the plaintiffs’ private property rights.125 The court 
found the defendant’s common law justification unavailing because 
the water allocation system in effect specifically permitted the level 
of allocation that the defendant was then seeking to modify based 
upon a finding of unreasonableness in light of the biological opin-
ions discussing the detrimental impact of the water diversions on 
protected species.126 
 The water rights contested in Tulare provide an excellent example 
of the potential impact of a more robust public trust doctrine on wa-
ter rights. The Tulare court’s finding of a physical taking of property 
in the face of evidence of important public concerns emphasizes that 
while water is officially treated as a public resource, states are in-
creasingly moving toward a tendency to “recognize[ ] permanent 
property rights in the private use of that resource.”127 The Tulare 
court evidently believed that the plaintiffs’ contractually conferred 
water rights antedated the government’s right to modify water use 
entitlements in the manner proposed in order to fulfill public trust 
objectives of avoiding species extinction.  
 The public trust doctrine is based upon the premise that appro-
priators do not acquire vested rights to violate public trust principles 
based upon their historical use of water.128 Especially in those states 
                                                                                                                     
 120. Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 315. The delta smelt were listed as a threatened species in 
1993. Earthjustice Press Release, supra note 120.  
 121. Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 315. 
 122. Id. at 318. Under California state law, title to water use is always with the state; 
the DWR receives, by permit, the right to the water’s use and then, by contract, transfers 
use rights to end-users such as the plaintiffs. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 319. 
 125. Id. at 321. 
 126. Id.; see also Benson, supra note 109, at 564. 
 127. Benson, supra note 3, at 35. Professor Benson also notes that “Colorado—which 
practices western water law in its purest and most traditional form—still allows no public 
interest consideration as to new appropriations.” Id. at 50. 
 128. Johnson, supra note 7, at 504. 
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where legislators refuse to restrain existing water rights in a mean-
ingful way for the benefit of the environment,129 a more expansive 
and flexible public trust doctrine could help the judiciary block ap-
propriators from exercising the fullness of the legal limits of their 
usufructuary rights when doing so would pose extreme harm to the 
water source and dependent species.130 An expanded public trust doc-
trine could provide for a healthier Tulare Lake Basin, where at-risk 
species are protected and the cost of just compensation under a tak-
ings regime is avoided. The Tulare decision is a clear example of the 
public trust doctrine, the prior appropriation scheme, and the police 
power intersecting at the crossroads where increasingly limited wa-
ter supplies and ever-growing demands for water meet.131 These mo-
ments of conflict are certain to increase in frequency and, as they do, 
the public trust doctrine should, more often than not, prevail.132  
 (b)   Klamath Irrigation District v. United States 
 The United States Court of Federal Claims in Klamath Irrigation 
District v. United States133 ruled against the plaintiffs, irrigators who 
held water right permits and claimed a vested use interest in the de-
livery of irrigation water from the Klamath Basin.134 The plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                     
 129. Id. at 511.  
  The major advantage to use of the public trust doctrine is that it can be the 
basis of judicial as well as legislative action. If applied by the courts, the doc-
trine can sometimes give greater recognition to public interests at times when 
legislatures are under excessive pressure by special interest lobbyists. . . . 
  . . . . 
  . . . One disadvantage of the police power is that legislative bodies are often 
subject to excessive pressure by special interest groups, and as a result, provide 
less-than-adequate protection to the more diffuse public interests. At such 
times court decisions often lead the way toward legitimate changes, encourag-
ing legislative bodies to follow with broadly conceived police power regulations. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 130. See Benson,  supra note 3, at 37 (discussing states that refuse to impose meaning-
ful constraints on water appropriators); Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 130-31 
(discussing the ability of private-party standing to counteract pressure by private or spe-
cial interest groups); Frazier, supra note 41, at 354-57 (discussing proposals to broaden the 
definition of public trust doctrine and also discussing deficiencies of the doctrine). 
 131. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 505. The prospect that by 2025 fresh drinking water 
will be inaccessible to two-thirds of the world’s population, THE CORPORATION (Zeitgeist 
Films 2003) (Chapter 18, Expansion Plan), is incredulous to some. For others, sometimes 
called visionaries, the limitations and stresses on water resources and the decline of sus-
tainable water systems are all too evident. Water resources may seem limitless, but even 
in the United States evidence to the contrary abounds. 
 132. Johnson, supra note 7, at 505. 
 133. 67 Fed. Cl. 504 (2005). For a detailed and informative discussion of the history of 
the Klamath Basin litigation, see Brian E. Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS 
W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1 (2002). The plaintiffs asserted that federal contracts were, 
at least in part, the source of their right to divert water; therefore, federal public trust doc-
trine would be the source of law for restraining their entitlement. Klamath, 67 Fed. Cl. at 
530-31. 
 134. Klamath, 67 Fed. Cl. at 506. 
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argued that their water interests were cognizable property rights en-
titling them to compensation under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause resulting from temporary reductions in their water use for ir-
rigation by the Department of Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation.135 
The Bureau of Reclamation decided to reduce water allotments after 
determining that continued operation at existing levels would likely 
have an adverse effect on certain species of fish in violation of the 
Endangered Species Act.136 The court considered three potential 
sources of the plaintiffs’ rights: (1) section 8 of the Federal Reclama-
tion Act of 1902;137 (2) the state laws of Oregon and California; and 
(3) contract law.138 
 First, the plaintiffs claimed that their water rights derived from 
the Reclamation Act.139 They argued that because their land was ap-
purtenant to the Klamath Basin waters, section 8 of the Reclamation 
Act vested in them a property interest in those waters.140 Thus, ac-
cording to the plaintiffs, their water interests derived from federal 
law and not from the state laws of Oregon and California.141 The 
United States Court of Federal Claims rejected their arguments and 
clarified that state law is the controlling authority governing the ap-
propriation of project water such as that involved in the Klamath 
Basin water reclamation project.142  
                                                                                                                     
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 513 (citing the ESA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000)). 
 137. 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-600e (2000)). Section 
8 of the Reclamation Act states, 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in 
any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the con-
trol, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any 
vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying 
out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws, and 
nothing herein shall in any way affect any right of any State or of the Federal 
Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from 
any interstate stream or the waters thereof. 
Id. § 383. Section 8 also provides that “the right to use of water acquired under the 
provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use 
shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right.” Id. § 372 (emphasis added). 
 138. Klamath, 67 Fed. Cl. at 516.   
 139. Id. at 516, 518 (stating that according to the relevant Senate Report, section 8 of 
the Act was not intended to interfere with irrigation laws developed by the states and ter-
ritories). They referenced “cases describing water rights associated with reclamation pro-
jects and arising out of appurtenancy as ‘the property of the land owners,’ or a ‘property 
right.’ ” Id. at 519 (citations omitted). 
 140. Id. at 516. Section 8 of the Reclamation Act provides that the Act is not to be con-
strued as interfering with vested water use rights acquired in connection with irrigation. 
See supra note 138. Section 8 requires the Secretary of the Interior to comply with state 
law governing the “control, appropriation, use or distribution of water.” Id. In his capacity 
as a water appropriator pursuant to section 8, the Secretary is thus bound to acquire his 
water rights in accordance with relevant state law. Klamath, 67 Fed. Cl. at 518. 
 141. Klamath, 67 Fed. Cl. at 516. 
 142. Id. at 518-19 (noting two exceptions when the Reclamation Act governed as 
against inconsistent state law: section 5, establishing limitations on the sale of reclamation 
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 Second, the court addressed the parties’ competing claims pursu-
ant to California and Oregon state law. The United States predicated 
its assertion of controlling rights to the Klamath Project water on 
reclamation legislation passed by California and Oregon in 1905.143 
The court concluded that the federal government was vested with the 
unappropriated water rights associated with the Klamath project.144 
The plaintiffs countered by asserting the beneficial use doctrine and 
argued that this concept limited the scope of the water rights ac-
quired by the United States, thereby leaving room for their assertion 
of contrary rights under state law.145 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
claims and then undertook to determine if they held water rights 
predicated on contracts with the federal government.146 
 Lastly, the court addressed the various contract claims and tak-
ings claims.147 It concluded that the remedy for any alleged infringe-
ment of the plaintiffs’ contract rights lay in the form of a contract 
claim, not a Fifth Amendment taking claim.148 Notably, the scope of 
the contract claims remained speculative for the court particularly in 
regard to contracts absolving the government from liability for short-
ages in water delivery resulting from causes such as drought.149 In 
the event of contracts not containing the “broad water shortage 
clauses,” the court opined that the sovereign acts doctrine could pro-
                                                                                                                     
water, and section 8, requiring water rights to be appurtenant to irrigated land and apply-
ing the beneficial use doctrine). 
 143. Id. at 523. California’s statute authorized the United States to lower the water 
levels of designated lakes, one of which was the Lower or Little Klamath Lake. 1905 Cal. 
Stat. 4; Klamath, 67 Fed. Cl. at 523 n.30. The purpose of the authorization was to facilitate 
irrigation and reclamation by the Irrigation Service of the United States. 1905 Cal. Stat. 4. 
By the same statute, the state conveyed to the federal government all of the state’s interest 
to any land uncovered as a result of lowering the water levels and which the state had not 
disposed of already. Id. Oregon enacted a similar statute allowing the United States to ap-
propriate certain waters within the state. 1905 Or. Laws 401-02; Klamath, 67 Fed. Cl. at 
523. In a separate law, Oregon’s legislature “authorized the raising and lowering of Upper 
Klamath Lake . . . , allowed the use of the bed of Upper Klamath Lake for storage of water 
for irrigation,” and again conveyed to the United States any claim the state had in land 
uncovered as a result of lowering the water levels (or draining the lakes) which had not 
previously been disposed of by the state of Oregon. Klamath, 67 Fed. Cl. at 523 (citing 1905 
Or.  Laws 63-64). 
 144. Klamath, 67 Fed. Cl. at 524. 
 145. Id. at 526. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Regarding pre-1905 potential interests vested in plaintiffs, the United States as-
serted that any such rights had been acquired by the Bureau of Reclamation and inte-
grated into the Klamath Irrigation Project. Id. Plaintiffs did not seriously contest this as-
sertion. Id. 
 148. “Taking claims rarely arise under government contracts because the Government 
acts in its commercial or proprietary capacity in entering contracts, rather than in its sov-
ereign capacity. Accordingly, remedies arise from the contracts themselves, rather than 
from the constitutional protection of private property rights.” Klamath, 67 Fed. Cl. at 531 
(quoting Hughes Commc’ns Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1060, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (citations omitted)). 
 149. Klamath, 67 Fed. Cl. at 535. 
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tect the federal government from contract liability.150 The court noted 
judicial authority for a finding that the federal government’s enact-
ment of the ESA and its enforcement of the Act were and are sover-
eign acts that override contractual obligations of the Bureau of Rec-
lamation to provide water.151  
 Private water users sometimes attempt to elevate their long-term 
reliance on water access to a legal entitlement to a certain amount of 
annual water appropriation.152 When private water uses cause “sub-
stantial impairment of the public interest in the . . . waters,”153 
though, the private interest should yield to the overwhelming public 
character of the property.154 The Klamath court did not apply a public 
trust analysis to settle the question of whether the plaintiffs had 
cognizable usufructuary interests in the subject waters. Had it done 
so, it could have, perhaps, avoided some of the needless blurring be-
tween contract rights and water use rights.155  
 The first question in Klamath and in any takings case is 
whether the plaintiff has any property right or entitlement as 
against the government.156 The second and equally important in-
quiry in the case of water law is:  What is the nature of one’s 
property right in water? If contract rights are the source of a wa-
ter user’s rights (as was asserted, at least in part, in Klamath) it 
seems a public trust doctrine approach would have provided a 
more expeditious and direct analysis. 
B.   A Lesser Alternative: Stricter Adherence to the Prior 
Appropriation Doctrine 
 Because of the historic shortage of water in the West, water law in 
those states developed differently than in the eastern states.157 In the 
East, the riparian rights doctrine dominated and water was “treated 
as a kind of common property.”158 The western states rejected this 
doctrine in favor of the prior appropriation doctrine, one of the pri-
                                                                                                                     
 150. Id. at 536. 
 151. Id. at 537. 
 152. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). More than 100 years 
ago, the United States Supreme Court held in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois that 
states cannot contract away management or control of public trust property. Id. at 453.  
And while the issue of a Fifth Amendment takings claim arose in that case, it was based 
upon unique facts causing the Court to anticipate the possible result under a takings 
analysis if the railroad company could prove it had made valuable improvements to the 
subject property. Id. at 455.  
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Gray, supra note 134, at 3-4. 
 156. Id. at 4. 
 157. Andreen, supra note 1, at 8. 
 158. Id. 
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mary engines for the commodification of water.159 According to this 
system of water distribution and entitlement, water is treated as a 
form of private property and loses the communal qualities with 
which it is imbued under a riparian rights regime.160 
 During the early history of the western states, water rights based 
upon the appropriative system “were affixed with sweeping generos-
ity.”161 The development of water law has ushered in a period of “in-
creasing toughness”162 in the administration of appropriative water 
rights but, as in most areas of the law, the pendulum may yet swing 
in the direction of the past, one in which the casual affixation of pri-
vate usufructuary rights resulted in costly mistakes.163  
 Stricter adherence to the prior appropriation doctrine, meaning a 
move toward the more generous approach to appropriative rights 
characteristic of the past, is a less beneficial alternative to this Arti-
cle’s suggestion to adopt a more robust public trust doctrine.164 A rig-
orous application of prior appropriation principles can result in the 
de facto privatization of a community’s water resources and also in 
waste, defined quantitatively as the overappropriation of a state’s 
surface waters.165 The private property model of ownership for real 
property is generally recognized as inapposite to the realities of 
natural water resources.166 Water’s fluidity and migratory nature, as 
well as its indispensability to societal growth and development, com-
pels the rejection of a real property, absolute ownership model and 
favors a use model in which interested parties enjoy a right of use 
that is less complete than the more familiar fee simple absolute own-
ership model of real property.167  
                                                                                                                     
 159. Id. at 8-9. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co. describes 
the prior appropriation doctrine as one that protects water previously appropriated for a 
beneficial use—such as manufacturing, irrigation, or mining—and that was recognized 
throughout the states and territories in the arid West as evidenced by legislation, judicial 
decision, and local and customary law. 295 U.S. 142, 154 (1935). 
 160. Andreen, supra note 1, at 8-9. 
 161. Cohen, supra note 1, at 1853. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. 
 164. Roy Whitehead, Jr. et al., The Value of Private Water Rights: From a Legal and 
Economic Perspective, 9 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 313, 318-19 (2004). 
 165. Cohen, supra note 1, at 1833-34 (discussing the public trust doctrine as a means of 
addressing overappropriation). Of course, waste can also be understood and discussed from 
the perspective of water quality. See, e.g., id. at 1817-19 (discussing water markets); Mary 
Ann King & Sally K. Fairfax, Beyond Bucks and Acres: Land Acquisition and Water, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 1941, 1964-67 (2005) (discussing water quality concerns in the context of 
conservation easements); infra notes 215, 236 and accompanying text (discussing water 
privatization). 
 166. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 492-93 (Haw. 2000). For a 
thoughtful discussion of the pro- and anti-market positions operating in the debate on wa-
ter law policy, see Cohen, supra note 1. 
 167. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 492-93; see also Cohen, supra note 
1, at 1819.  
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 “The basic rules of prior appropriation effectively lock in estab-
lished water uses and allow them to continue without change. . . . 
[W]ater rights last forever, and their terms are rarely amended to re-
flect changed conditions.”168 Water rights vest when the appropriator 
diverts water for what is considered to be a beneficial use, making 
the beneficial use doctrine one of the few constraints on the first ap-
propriator.169 But the beneficial use doctrine as initially conceived 
was a weak constraint because western states applied the doctrine by 
defining “beneficial use in terms of diversion of water out of streams 
and considered water left in a stream as effectively wasted.”170 
 The first appropriator has an absolute right, subject to the benefi-
cial use doctrine, to take an unlimited quantity of water for use at 
any location, no matter how distant from the water source, even if it 
causes the water source to be completely depleted.171 The first water 
appropriator obtains an exclusive use right regardless of the number 
of junior would-be claimants or the meritoriousness of their proposed 
uses relative to those of the first claimant.172 “These water rights 
typically last forever as long as they are used . . . .”173 
 The requirement of actual beneficial use for the vesting of appro-
priated water rights was intended to prevent monopolization and wa-
ter speculation.174 But the basic elements of the prior appropriation 
                                                                                                                     
But the elemental fact fueling the issues that scarcity serves up is that water is 
the basis for life. Where there have been failed experiments in privatization 
and weak political regimes, the stakes that have brought distributive justice 
questions into the water delivery arena have proven to be feverishly high. 
Where allocative decisions regarding water have been linked to class injustice 
on a national scale, as in South Africa and Brazil, these societies, in the midst 
of their recent experiences with political molt, have included egalitarian water 
rights within their new democratic-constitutional schemes.  
Id. 
 168. Benson, supra note 3, at 51. 
 169. Whitehead, Jr. et al., supra note 164, at 318-19. 
 170. Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61 
U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 258 (1990) [hereinafter Sax, The Constitution]. 
 171. There is no requirement that property bordering the water source receive any 
form of benefit or entitlement. Whitehead, Jr. et al., supra note 165, at 319-20. 
 172. Id. at 318-19; see also Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 125-26 (1983); Ir-
win v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855) (one of the first cases upholding the doctrine of prior 
appropriation). 
 173. Benson, supra note 3, at 35; “When something as important as water is scarce, 
those who control it can be powerful indeed. The fear of concentrated power and control 
over resources in the developing West shaped water law generally and the beneficial use 
doctrine [an indispensable component of the prior appropriation doctrine] in particular.” 
Neuman, supra note 72, at 963 (citations omitted). 
 174. Neuman, supra note 72, at 964; see also State Dep’t of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 
1044, 1049 (Wash. 1993). Determining whether the beneficial use doctrine has been com-
plied with requires consideration of two elements of water law. Id. First, beneficial use re-
fers to the types of activities and purposes for which water is being used. Id. Second, one 
must consider whether the appropriator is engaging in a reasonable use of water–meaning 
that once the beneficial use has been established, the question becomes what amount of 
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doctrine, even when tempered by beneficial use requirements, pre-
sent strong indicia of a private property regime with the accompany-
ing rights of private control over access and alienation. 
 In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County175 
(the Mono Lake case), the California judiciary for the first time con-
sidered the interplay between the public trust doctrine and the prior 
appropriation doctrine.176 The court’s decision, finding that Los Ange-
les’ water rights could be reduced by the public trust doctrine, was an 
exception to the trend favoring economic considerations over envi-
ronmental concerns in the developing conflict between water appro-
priators and conservationists.177 “[O]ne old tool–the public trust doc-
trine–[was employed] to revise rights granted under another–the 
doctrine of appropriative rights.”178 
 Mono Lake was at the center of the National Audubon dispute. It 
is one of North America’s oldest lakes, being at least 760,000 years 
old, and one of the largest lakes in the state of California.179 In 1940, 
the California Water Resources Board granted permission to the De-
partment of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles to “appro-
priate virtually the entire flow of four of the five streams flowing into 
the lake.”180 The diversions lowered the lake’s water level and dimin-
ished the lake’s surface area by one-third.181 Between 1940 and 1983, 
the year National Audubon was decided, lake levels fell from 6417 
feet above mean sea level to 6378.6 feet above mean sea level.182 Con-
tinued diversions at projected amounts were certain to threaten the 
scenic and ecological conditions of the lake.183 
 The National Audubon Society sued to enjoin the diversions, alleg-
ing that Mono Lake’s bed, waters, and shores were protected by the 
public trust doctrine.184 For the first time in California’s history, the 
court had to determine the relationship between the public trust doc-
trine and the appropriative water rights system that had dominated 
                                                                                                                     
water is necessary to achieve the beneficial use. Id. Use in excess of this determined 
amount would potentially constitute a breach of the doctrine. See id. 
 175. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). 
 176. Id. at 712. 
 177. Benson, supra note 3, at 50-51. 
 178. Cohen, supra note 1, at 1833. 
 179. Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 711; Mono Lake Committee, Statistics, 
http://www.monolake.org/naturalhistory/stats.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2006).  
 180. Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 711. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Mono Lake Committee, Yearly Lake Levels, http://www.monolake.org/ 
live/lakelevel/yearly.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2006); see also Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. 
v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1093 (Idaho 1983) (discussing lake diver-
sions and their impact on Mono Lake). 
 183. Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 711. 
 184. Id. at 712. 
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the state’s water law since the era of the California gold rush.185 The 
court began by noting that the public trust doctrine and the appro-
priative rights system represented a “clash of values” and ideologies, 
all highlighted by the case before it.186 Mono Lake, a natural resource 
of scenic and ecological significance of national proportions, would 
certainly be harmed by continued diversions of water.187 Yet, at the 
same time, the court could not ignore the city of Los Angeles’ appar-
ent need for water, “its reliance on rights granted by the [Water Re-
sources Board], [and the substantial] cost of curtailing diversions.”188 
 The court described California’s water law as an integration of the 
public trust doctrine and of the appropriative rights doctrine and 
held that in striking the balance between the two, state authorities 
must be afforded the right to grant usufructuary rights to divert wa-
ter from the tributaries of navigable bodies such as Mono Lake.189 In 
holding that the public trust doctrine is not subordinate to vested 
water rights, the court stated, 
[T]he foregoing . . . amply demonstrate the continuing power of the 
state as administrator of the public trust, a power which extends 
to the revocation of previously granted rights or to the enforcement 
of the trust against lands long thought free of the trust. Except for 
those rare instances in which a grantee may acquire a right to use 
former trust property free of trust restrictions, the grantee holds 
subject to the trust, and while he may assert a vested right to the 
servient estate (the right of use subject to the trust) and to any 
improvements he erects, he can claim no vested right to bar recog-
nition of the trust or state action to carry out its purposes.190 
 Importantly, the court acknowledged the dual nature of the state’s 
water rights system, with the public trust doctrine safeguarding im-
portant community values and access to community resources and 
the prior appropriation doctrine helping to ensure the continued eco-
nomic development of the state.191 The court structured a resolution 
according to which,  
[o]nce the state has approved an appropriation, the public trust 
imposes a duty of continuing supervision over the taking and use 
of the appropriated water. In exercising its sovereign power to al-
locate water resources in the public interest, the state is not con-
                                                                                                                     
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id.  
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 723 (citation omitted); see also Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle 
Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1094 (Idaho 1983) (affirming that the public trust doctrine 
takes precedence over vested water rights). 
 191. Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 727-28. 
28  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
 
fined by past allocation decisions which may be incorrect in light of 
current knowledge or inconsistent with current needs.192  
Thus, National Audubon stands for the proposition that when the in-
terests protected by the prior appropriation doctrine undermine pub-
lic trust purposes, the state’s public trust duties impose not only a 
duty of continuing supervision but even a duty to reallocate previ-
ously designated resources.  
 The “first in time is first in right” philosophy that underlies the 
prior appropriation doctrine was essential to early western interests, 
as it assured developers that they would continue to enjoy their ex-
clusive access to waters put to beneficial use, undisturbed by those 
coming later.193 But this philosophy “is a rule of capture, a blunt in-
strument, one of the most primitive forms of property ownership.”194 
Expansion of the public trust doctrine does not threaten beneficiar-
ies of the prior appropriation doctrine as long as they do not benefit 
at the expense of the public interest.195 “State trusteeship means 
that in so allocating waters, the state authorities must act in the 
public interest.”196 
 Historic uses of water must be flexible enough to accommodate 
present needs.197 Though the balance is a delicate one, the current re-
sistance to change that may attend my proposal should not be dis-
couraging. The development of water laws in the West required a 
breaking of traditions–cultural, legal, and economic.198 The resulting 
dismantlement of the traditional doctrine of riparian water law and 
the embrace of the new doctrine of prior appropriation water law 
was, for the times, a radical change.199 Such changes were and are 
still viewed by many as necessary to the development and transfor-
                                                                                                                     
 192. Id. at 728 (emphasis added). 
 193. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 620 n.11 (1983). 
 194. Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 469. 
 195. Innumerable sources are ripe for citation in support of this proposition. One of the 
most eloquent expressions is Professor Carol Rose’s discussion of public rights and private 
property in the context of then recent regulatory takings legislation: 
Just as a private owner should not suffer expropriation for the neighborly act of 
allowing the public to use his land when it caused him no inconvenience, nei-
ther should the public’s rights be expropriated simply because a private party 
used common resources at a time when those resources were not scarce or con-
gested and when it would have been “churlish” for public officials to try to pre-
vent the private use.  
Rose, A Dozen Propositions, supra note 19, at 283. 
 196. Trelease, supra note 108, at 648. 
 197. MARC REISNER & SARAH BATES, OVERTAPPED OASIS: REFORM OR REVOLUTION FOR 
WESTERN WATER 137 (1990). 
 198. Id. at 145. 
 199. Id.; see also State ex rel. State Game Comm’n v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 
421, 428-30 (N.M. 1945) (discussing the doctrine of prior appropriations as superseding the 
doctrine of riparian water rights in many western states, including New Mexico). 
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mation of the American West into what it has become today.200 The 
doctrine of prior appropriation benefits those who are both intolerant 
of change and presently entitled to appropriate the full extent of wa-
ter resources they desire.201 The deficiencies of the prior appropria-
tion doctrine require another transformation of western water law, in 
the same spirit of the transformation that ushered in the prior ap-
propriation doctrine as a replacement to the doctrine of riparian 
rights.202 The doctrine of prior appropriation encourages inefficiencies 
in water consumption and is often inapposite to environmental pro-
tection and conservation.203 “[A]lthough western water law has been 
modernized in some respects, prior appropriation presents a classic 
example of how the passage of time and a changed social conscious-
ness can make legal rules archaic.”204 
 The public trust doctrine strongly supports public claims of access 
to scarce water resources.205 Water, perhaps more than any other re-
source, has an inherently public essence due to its very nature as es-
sential to life and to development.206 Water is a vital common re-
source; government intervention to protect its quality and quantity 
and to ensure its most socially beneficial use is appropriate.207 Wa-
                                                                                                                     
 200. E.g., Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935) (dis-
cussing early efforts to redeem desert land in certain western states through modification 
of existing water policies. “Necessarily, that involved the complete subordination of the 
common-law doctrine of riparian rights to that of appropriation. And this substitution of 
the rule of appropriation for that of the common law was to have momentous conse-
quences.” Id. at 158); REISNER & BATES, supra note 197, at 145.  
 201. REISNER & BATES, supra note 197, at 146. 
 202. Over time, government has begun to perceive that “property rights in water are 
not only restrictively defined, but [that] definitions openly anticipate changes that may di-
minish or abolish uses that were once permitted. For example, the requirement that uses 
be reasonable and beneficial, and not wasteful, is central to water law doctrine.  In a lead-
ing California case . . . , the California Supreme Court noted: ‘What is a beneficial use at 
one time may, because of changed conditions, become a waste of water at a later time.’ ” 
Joseph L. Sax, Rights that “Inhere in the Title Itself”: The Impact of the Lucas Case on 
Western Water Law, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943, 951 (1993) (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added); see also Sax, The Constitution, supra note 171, at 260-67 (discussing the constitu-
tional status of water rights as less protected that other forms of property rights). “It is not 
unconstitutional for regulation to constrain pre-existing uses or rights that were legal 
when initiated. Retroactivity is not the test of compensability.” Id. at 260. 
 203. REISNER & BATES, supra note 197, at 146. 
 204. Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 469. 
 205. See Rose, Comedy, supra note 24, at 722-23 (discussing traditional uses of the 
public trust doctrine). 
 206. See Neuman, supra note 72, at 964-65 (discussing concerns about speculation and 
monopoly that influenced the development of many western states’ water codes); Rose, 
Comedy, supra note 24, at 713-14 (discussing increased public access to waterways and 
what some consider to be a public need for greater public access to water resources).  
 207. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 72, at 948-62 (discussing government’s role in safe-
guarding common resources); Rose, A Dozen Propositions, supra note 19 (discussing the 
changing nature of private rights in water to reflect changed societal conditions); Sax, The 
Constitution, supra note 170, at 271-77 (discussing water appropriators as a source of wa-
ter pollution and supporting the right of the public to have state government sustain and 
protect the waters within its boundaries). 
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ter’s public essence “leads to a public, nontransferable obligation to 
maintain water resources for the benefit of the public purposes [it] 
serve[s].”208 Enhancing government’s role through broader applica-
tion of the public trust doctrine is an efficient means of using an ex-
isting and familiar doctrine to reach a necessary result.209 
III.   IMPLICATIONS OF A MORE ROBUST PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
A.   Public Ownership Allows for Greater Decentralization Without 
Infringing on Properly Vested Private Property Rights 
 Public rights are equally important as private rights in a democ-
ratic government because the ultimate goal of democratic institutions 
is the maximization of the sum of all resources, both public and pri-
vate.210 Decentralization of real property disperses the benefits of 
property access among a broad segment of the public. This type of 
decentralization is the hallmark of a democratic system that affords 
its citizens both dignity and liberty in reasonable amounts.211 Just as 
with rules governing real property, water law must evolve to give 
citizens increased access to bodies of water that hold a legitimate po-
tential for public use and enjoyment. 
 “Of all the concepts known to American law, only the public trust 
doctrine seems to have the breadth and substantive content which 
might make it useful as a tool of general application for citizens seek-
ing to develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource manage-
ment problems.”212 Citizens should have guaranteed access to biologi-
cally diverse, highly functioning, and healthy ecosystems; a broader 
                                                                                                                     
 208. Cohen, supra note 1, at 1847 (discussing John D. Leshy’s article, A Conversation 
About Takings and Water Rights, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1985 (2005)). 
 209. See Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 147-50 (discussing the numerus 
clauses principle). Expansion of the public trust doctrine’s scope as discussed above does 
not violate this ancient civil law doctrine, which has become widely respected in the 
American common law tradition. 
 210. Brown, Taking the Takings Claim, supra note 18, at 35-36 n.165 (quoting Richard 
A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 
STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1371 (1993), for the proposition that one of the most important pur-
poses of democratic institutions such as governments is maximizing social welfare); Rose, 
A Dozen Propositions, supra note 19, at 298. 
 211. Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 126-32; Carol Necole Brown, Casting 
Lots: The Illusion of Justice and Accountability in Property Allocation, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 65, 
66 n.1 (2005); Brown, Taking the Takings Claim, supra note 18, at 46-47. 
 212. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 30, at 474 (footnote omitted); see also 
Rose, A Dozen Propositions, supra note 19, at 277-82 (discussing the significant traditional 
role of federal and state courts in evolving the scope of public rights and resources and 
stating that courts were generally willing to intervene when legislatures seemed inclined 
to cede public rights to private interests). Of course, the public trust doctrine is judicially 
constructed law and as such varies among the various states as well as at the federal ver-
sus state level. Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 145 n.274. 
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application of a public trust doctrine with redefined purposes has the 
potential of creating this access.213  
 The expansion of public rights of water access will, as with most 
environmental law disputes, engender conflicts between the expecta-
tions of private property owners (or in the case of water law, prior 
appropriators engaged in beneficial use of waters)214 and the expecta-
tions of the public (the common property owners).215 A more robust 
public trust doctrine is not synonymous with the destruction of prop-
erly vested216 private property rights and well-settled, private-party 
investment expectations.217 “Property rights arise when it becomes 
economically rational for affected persons to internalize external 
costs and benefits.”218 Past extensions of the public trust doctrine 
have resulted in increases of the public’s welfare over an extended 
period of time.219 Further applications of public trust principles, as 
set forth herein, hold the same promise for long-term maximization 
                                                                                                                     
 213. Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 145-47; Frazier, supra note 41, at 356. 
Professor Frazier also discusses deficiencies of the public trust doctrine as a tool for achiev-
ing biological diversity: 
(1) as judge-made law, the particulars of the public trust doctrine vary widely 
from state to state; (2) the public trust doctrine is developed in a piecemeal 
fashion, as a result of the vagaries of litigation, without the unifying structure 
of a statute or a constitutional provision; (3) the public trust doctrine, in its 
present form, is not well suited for the protection of plants; and (4) courts cur-
rently use the public trust doctrine to protect public use of a resource, not to 
protect the resource itself. 
Id. at 356-57 (citing Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of Bio-
logical Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 325 (1991)). Of course, in the context of water law, 
the public’s interest in waters governed by the public trust doctrine would be usufructuary 
in nature; thus, item number four in Professor’s Frazier of public trust shortcomings would 
not be a drawback in the context of water law. See, e.g, Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of 
Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 711 (Cal. 1983) (discussing the ecological and biological di-
versity dependent upon the sustenance of Mono Lake for its continued survival). 
 214. E.g., Galt v. Montana, 731 P.2d 912, 916 (Mont. 1987) (“The real property inter-
ests of private landowners are important as are the public’s property interest in water. 
Both are constitutionally protected. These competing interests, when in conflict, must be 
reconciled to the extent possible.”); Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 112-25 (dis-
cussing expectations of future generations in the context of real property and perpetual 
conservation easements). 
 215. Frazier, supra note 41, at 299 n.4; e.g., Nat’l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 723 (discussing 
vested rights in the context of the public trust doctrine). 
 216. National Audubon, 658 P.2d at 723. “Except for those rare instances in which a 
grantee may acquire a right to use former trust property free of trust restrictions, the 
grantee holds subject to the trust, and while he may assert a vested right to the servient 
estate (the right of use subject to the trust) and to any improvements he erects, he can 
claim no vested right to bar recognition of the trust or state action to carry out its pur-
poses.” Id. 
 217. See infra Part III.B and accompanying text. 
 218. Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 112. 
 219. See id. at 112-13 (discussing rule-utilitarianism, which focuses on long-term wel-
fare maximization); supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the history of broadening the scope of the 
public trust); supra Part II.B (stating that when public trust purposes conflict with the 
prior appropriation doctrine, public trust purposes must prevail).  
32  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
 
of the public welfare.220 The essentiality of water to individual sur-
vival and societal growth compels close consideration of the notion 
that water use interests should lie more in the public property “pub-
lic domain”221 than in the realm of private property.  
 The tradition of publicly held rights is well-established in the 
United States. Care must be taken to ensure that the public interest 
in inherently public resources is not lost sight of in the effort to de-
fine the nature of private interests in these very same resources.222 
Roman law recognized the nature of some tangible property as being 
that of res communes, possessing a character that made such tangi-
bles as the ocean difficult, if not impossible, to exclusively appropri-
ate.223 Relatedly, and at times confusingly,224 Roman law recognized 
other tangibles as res publicae, or things that belonged to the public 
and to which the public gained access by operation of law.225 Exam-
ples included ports, harbors, and perpetually flowing rivers.226 The 
prevalent idea in American jurisprudence of a public trust securing 
for its citizens an interest in certain resources is closely akin to re-
sources belonging to Roman law’s res publicae.227 Neither doctrine is 
inapposite to traditional notions of private property as developed in 
                                                                                                                     
 220. See Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 112-21. (discussing the appropri-
ate measure of efficiency gains in the context of scarce resources). 
 221. Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public 
Property in the Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (2003) [hereinafter Rose, 
Romans, Roads]. 
 222. Rose, A Dozen Propositions, supra note 19, at 268-70; Leshy, supra note 73 (dis-
cussing, generally, the dynamic conflict between private parties in protecting usufructuary 
water interests and government in reallocating water to fulfill important public purposes 
and without the need to pay compensation). 
 223. WILLIAM A. HUNTER, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 65 (rev. 9th ed. 1950); Daniel 
R. Coquillette, Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic Property Cases 
About the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 800-02 (1979). Compare Rose, Romans, 
Roads, supra note 221, at 92-105 (discussing res nullius (things belonging to no one), res 
communes (things open to all by their nature), and res publicae (things belonging to the 
public and open to the public by operation of law) as examples of nonexclusive types of 
property according to Roman law), with Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 146 
(discussing the jus privatum (the private property right), jus publicum (the public trust), 
and jus regium (the power of regulation) in the context of the public trust doctrine).  The 
Roman law forms of nonexclusive properties captured by Professor Rose are roughly analo-
gous to the distinct interest in trust resources identified by the United States Supreme 
Court in the seminal public trust case, Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 
387 (1892). 
 224. Rose, Romans, Roads, supra note 221, at 96. 
 225. ANDREW BORKOWSKI, TEXTBOOK ON ROMAN LAW 143 (1994); W. W. BUCKLAND, A 
TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 183 (rev. 3d ed. 1966); WILLIAM 
A. HUNTER, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 65-66 (rev. 9th ed. 1950); Rose, Romans, Roads, 
supra note 221, at 96. 
 226. Rose, Romans, Roads, supra note 221, at 96. 
 227. Id. at 97; see also notes 223-29 (discussing the relatedness between Professor 
Rose’s discussion of Roman law categorization of nonexclusive property and the categoriza-
tions as developed within the public trust doctrine). 
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the American legal system.228 The proper balance between safeguard-
ing private property entitlements and securing public access to re-
sources inherently public in nature increases efficiency gains for the 
masses of people by balancing society’s need to protect essential 
natural resources and the needs of citizens for structured and stable 
property regimes.229  
B.   Analogies: Conservation Easements, Water Trusts, and the Public 
Trust Doctrine 
 Until it becomes a commodity, many in the market will not pay 
attention to the environmental condition; it is not part of the public’s 
psyche.230 “Many interest groups, from conservative business leaders 
to environmental groups, are calling for water to move more freely in 
response to market forces. It appears, then, that the twenty-first cen-
tury goals regarding . . . the treatment of water as an economic com-
modity . . . may be somewhat mixed and even conflicting.”231 We have 
begun to experience the consequences of efforts to commodify water 
through privatization; we are beginning to see a private taking of the 
water commons.232 Clean, abundant water is a form of wealth and is 
created by forces external to mankind.233 Capturing it, bounding it 
through privatization, is not wealth creation but rather wealth usur-
                                                                                                                     
 228. Rose, supra note 221, at 103. 
 229. Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 132-50; see, e.g., Neuman, supra note 
72, at 963 (noting that control of water resources creates dangers of concentrated power 
and, inferentially, power imbalances). 
 230. See, e.g., THE CORPORATION, supra note 131 (Chapter 9, Trading on 9/11 and the 
discussions of Carlton Brown, Commodities Trader, discussing the impact of environ-
mental effects and of devastation on the value of commodities like gold and oil); see also 
King, supra note 52, at 497-98 (discussing the support and opposition to water trusts as a 
market-based approach to solving environmental concerns regarding water quality and 
abundance). Water trusts as a “public-private partnership[ ] have . . . rais[ed] questions of 
their democratic legitimacy, [and] the appropriateness of the use of public funds for private 
purposes . . . .” Id. at 497; see also Brendan O’ Shaughnessy, Water Company Awash in 
Controversy, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 7, 2005, at 1A (discussing objections and problems 
attending the hiring of a private company by the city of Indianapolis to run the city’s water 
utility). “[O]fficials hailed the public-private partnership as a victory for customers.” Id. 
“[E]nvironmental groups . . . and [others] . . . say water should be treated as a public trust 
rather than a commodity.” Id. 
 231. Neuman, supra note 72, at 974; see also Cohen, supra note 1, at 1838-42 (articu-
lating the case for and against a market-based solution to the water dilemma).  
 232. Cohen, supra note 1, at 1817-19 (discussing privatization of water and some of the 
negative attending consequences); see also THE CORPORATION, supra note 131 (Chapter 10, 
Boundary Issues, presents Jeremy Rifkind, President, Foundation on Economic Trends, 
who comments and discusses various forms of environment commodification including air, 
land, and oceans and is followed by Elaine Bernard, Executive Director, Trade Union Pro-
gram, Harvard, who discusses wealth creation and usurpation and privatization of the 
public commons). 
 233. See Brown, Taking the Takings Claim, supra note 18, at 48-64 (discussing defini-
tions and conceptualizations of wealth); see also THE CORPORATION, supra note 131 (Chap-
ter 10, Boundary Issues, Elaine Bernard, Executive Director, Trade Union Program, Har-
vard, discussing wealth creation and usurpation and privatization of the public commons). 
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pation.234 Water is too essential to the public good to be commodified 
and treated as a mere business opportunity; it rightfully enjoys a his-
tory of protection through public regulation and tradition.235 
Emerging new boundaries for the public trust doctrine can help 
respond to our changing societal condition by further protecting 
the water commons.  
 In the natural environment, land and water are inextricably 
mixed; it is impossible to experience one, at least for any significant 
amount of time, without the other.236 But when it comes to conserva-
tion, real property conservation tools differ significantly from those 
available for water conservation.237 And it is sound to acknowledge 
these inherent differences by addressing them through mechanisms 
specific to the essence of the particular resource. In a recent article, 
Sally K. Fairfax and Mary Ann King explored the propriety of using 
conservation easements to address water law problems.238 They con-
cluded that numerous problems attend using conservation easements 
to address water quality and quantity concerns.239 My assertions are 
consistent with those of Fairfax and King.240 
 In the realm of real property, conservation easements have been 
used in the United States for more than a century to preserve and 
protect the environment.241  
The concept of land transactions aimed at promoting land conser-
vation emanated from two historical developments. The first was 
the creation of land trusts, which are nonprofit organizations that 
seek to conserve open space for the public benefit. . . . The second 
development in the land conservation movement was the creation, 
by state enabling legislation, of the conservation easement, which 
                                                                                                                     
 234. THE CORPORATION, supra note 131 (Chapter 10, Boundary Issues, presents Elaine 
Bernard, Executive Director, Trade Union Program, Harvard, who suggests that privatiza-
tion can usurp wealth). 
 235. See THE CORPORATION, supra note 131 (Chapter 10, Boundary Issues, discusses 
the benefits of protecting public resources through public regulation and tradition). But see 
King, supra note 52 (discussing the advantages of water markets, specifically water 
trusts). 
 236. Arnold, supra note 29, at 10160. 
 237. See id. at 10168 (discussing the disconnections in the American legal system be-
tween property in water and property in land). 
 238. King & Fairfax, supra note 165. 
 239. Id.  at 1981-84. 
 240. See infra notes 244-67 and accompanying text. For a more detailed discussion of 
conservation easements, see Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6. My approach to the 
water law dilemma through exploration of and reference to the conservation easement, an 
increasing popular tool for land conservation, is not novel. For an extremely detailed and 
thoughtful discussion of the convergence and linkages between land and water systems 
and the methods of conserving both, with reference to conservation easements and water 
trusts, see King & Fairfax, supra note 165 (discussed infra). 
 241. Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 94-101. 
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allowed land trusts to acquire preservation rights without pur-
chasing use or possessory rights.242 
Conservation easements limit the permissible uses of real prop-
erty for the purpose of “protect[ing] and preserv[ing] natural re-
sources and sensitive habitats.”243 They produce public goods in 
the form of preservation and conservation of historic sites, endan-
gered plant and animal life, natural ecosystems and landscapes, 
and agricultural lands.244  
 Parties interested in creating and conveying conservation ease-
ments do so in writing, typically by an instrument called either a 
conservation deed or a conservation easement.245 Grantors often own 
real property in fee simple absolute and contract with their grantees 
or holders to legally restrict the type and/or amount of development 
that may occur on the land that is the subject of the grant.246 The 
conservation easement may impose affirmative duties on either the 
easement holder, the grantor of the conservation easement, or 
both.247 “Failure to fulfill an affirmative duty may result in suits by 
owners of real property affected by conservation easements, holders 
of conservation easements, those possessing a ‘third-party right of 
                                                                                                                     
 242. Id. at 96-97 (citations omitted). 
 243. Id. at 95. 
 244. Id. at 92 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 1.6 cmt. b (2000)). 
 245. See, e.g., UNIFORM CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, § 2 (1982) [hereinafter UCEA]. 
 246. THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK: MANAGING LAND CONSERVATION AND 
HISTORIC PRESERVATION EASEMENT PROGRAMS 5 (Janet Diehl & Thomas S. Barrett eds., 
1988); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 1.6(1) (2000). Grantors may convey 
conservation easements to private parties and noncharitable entities as well as to govern-
mental entities and charitable conservation organizations that qualify as conservation 
easement holders for purposes of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act. Id. § 1.6 cmt. a 
(2000); UCEA § 1 cmt.; JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND 
LICENSES IN LAND § 12:2, at 12-4, 12-5 (2001). Conveyance of a conservation easement to 
other than a “qualified organization,” however, will not qualify for certain tax benefits. See 
I.R.C. § 170(h)(3) (2000). 
 247. E.g., UCEA § 4 cmt.; see also Richmond v. United States, 699 F. Supp. 578, 579 
(E.D. La. 1988). Plaintiffs conveyed a facade easement to the City of New Orleans to be 
administered by the Vieux Carré Commission (VCC), a governmental agency responsible 
for historic preservation in the French Quarter. “Before accepting the facade donation, the 
City of New Orleans, acting through the VCC, required a commitment that certain specific 
renovations be made to the real property.”  Id. The plaintiff’s share of the renovation cost 
was nearly $59,000. Id. See also Missouri Coalition for the Env’t v. Conservation Comm’n 
of Mo., 940 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). Plaintiff argued, unsuccessfully, that the 
public had a right to compel the state conservation agency to maintain property as “an un-
improved ‘greenbelt’ area” for public use. Id. at 529. The property had been restricted for 
this purpose by federal court decree as a result of litigation commenced nearly twenty 
years earlier. Id. The court found that the deed did not dedicate the property to the public; 
“[r]ather, it merely reiterated the restrictions set forth in the federal decree and conveyed 
the property to the Commission.” Id. at 531. 
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enforcement,’ or such other parties as authorized by applicable 
state law.”248 
 The conservation trust model, incorporating land trusts and con-
servation easements, has worked well as a tool for protecting real 
property and perhaps provides some explanation for the relatively 
recent emergence of the water trust as a tool for water resource pro-
tection.249 Water trusts are private organizations operating mostly in 
the western United States. They function under the assumption that 
the conservation land trust model may be imported to apply to cer-
tain water resources,250 and they promote private organizations’ ac-
quisition and transfer of certain water rights.251 
 Water trusts are similar to land trusts; they are private, typically 
nonprofit organizations that engage in market transactions to ac-
quire water (as opposed to land) for conservation purposes by en-
hancing instream flows and protecting minimum flows.252 The idea 
behind water trusts has been to import the privatization model of 
land trusts and their conservation easements into water law. Water 
trusts engage in private transactions to buy consumptive usufructu-
ary rights and convert these to instream flow water rights.253 Water 
trusts, though still relatively new and almost exclusively used in the 
western states, are representative of a growing trend toward a “mar-
ket-based approach[ ] to address environmental concerns.”254 
                                                                                                                     
 248. Brown, A Time to Preserve, supra note 6, at 95-96 (citing UCEA § 3(a)(1)-(4)); see, 
e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-9-307 (2004) (stating that conservation easements may be en-
forced by “holders or beneficiaries of the easement,” which  was interpreted to include resi-
dents of Tennessee in Tennessee Envtl. Council, Inc. v. Bright Par 3 Assocs., L.P., No. 2003-
01982-COA-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 155, at *3-*4, *7-*8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 10.1-1013 (2004) (stating that actions affecting conservation easements may 
be brought by, among others, “person[s] with standing under other statutes or common 
law”). 
 249. King, supra note 52, at 507-11; see also Cohen, supra note 1, at 1826 (discussing 
the use of conservation easements “as a private-party device for placing water resources 
under perpetual state control”). 
 250. King, supra note 52, at 496-98. 
 251. Id. at 518. But cf. Janet C. Neuman & Cheyenne Chapman, Wading into the Water 
Market: The First Five Years of the Oregon Water Trust, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 135, 167-
72 (1999). Neuman and Chapman discuss the private versus public holding of instream 
rights using the state of Oregon and the Oregon Water Trust as an example. Trusts can 
find themselves “relegated to being only a ‘broker,’ merely arranging deals whereby willing 
sellers would turn over their water rights to the State of Oregon.” Id. at 168. Ultimately, 
the Oregon Water Trust succeeded in getting the Water Resources Department to issue a 
form of water right in the Trust’s own name. Id. at 170. The article nicely details some of 
the complexities of the public/private trade in water rights. 
 252. Neuman & Chapman, supra note 251, at 137-53. 
 253. Id. at 135-36; see also King, supra note 52, at 495 (stating that “water trusts rely 
upon market transactions to acquire and transfer water rights to instream uses”). 
 254. King, supra note 52, at 496. 
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 Many prior appropriation states are already using instream flow 
rights as a means of addressing water conservation.255 Before in-
stream uses can be incorporated into the prior appropriation system, 
they must be legally recognized as beneficial uses.256 Once an in-
stream use obtains the legal status of a beneficial use, states may 
then allow instream rights to be appropriated and/or may allow ex-
isting rights to instream flows to be transferred.257 Appropriated in-
stream flow rights “possess the priority date of [their] appropriation, 
while the transfer would allow the instream right to retain the senior 
priority date of the original right.”258 
 The advantage of the water trust model for many is that it paci-
fies many consumptive water users by using the market rather than 
regulation to achieve environmental protection.259 Yet while import-
ing tools from the land conservation movement into the water arena 
can be appealing, it ignores the deep historical and environmental 
distinctions between the property paradigms governing real property 
and water. 
 Fee simple ownership of land is very well understood and em-
braced within the American property system. Water, though, has al-
ways been recognized as so distinct as to be outside of this under-
standing of property ownership. Water itself cannot be owned or pri-
vatized; rather, only the right of use, the usufruct, may be acquired. 
Even the most ardent private property advocates concede water’s 
uniquely communal nature. This concession certainly does not trans-
late into a rejection of water markets as an appropriate means of al-
locating water, but it can often lead to the type of conundrum en-
countered by the Oregon Water Trust, the first water trust in the 
United States.260 
The Trust’s founding Board was . . . somewhat surprised at the 
amount of resistance it encountered to the voluntary sale of water 
rights within the community of agricultural water rights holders. 
It appears that some segments of the farming and ranching com-
munity hold firm to the private property rights claim when resist-
ing government regulation or environmentalists’ criticism, but are 
more willing to consider water rights a communal resource when 
                                                                                                                     
 255. Id. at 505-06 (discussing Washington and Oregon specifically); Neuman & Chap-
man, supra note 251, at 135-53, 170 (discussing the Oregon Water Trust in great detail, 
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 260. See id. at 135. 
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one of their neighbors proposes to sell a right for conversion to in-
stream flows. In that case, the individual’s right to make a volun-
tary deal with his own property takes a back seat to the neighbors’ 
and interest groups’ view that the water should stay on the land in 
irrigation rather than go in-stream to help fish.261 
Water trusts can play a role in responding to changing environ-
mental needs,262 but using water trusts and water markets “to con-
vert significant amounts of water to in-stream flows will be a fairly 
expensive proposition”263 and undervalues the public’s entitlement 
to modify private usufructuary rights (without paying compensa-
tion) when exercise of these rights imposes an undue burden on 
the public.264 
 Requiring the public to pay to maintain instream flows in bodies 
of water that are important public resources allows prior appropria-
tors to profit from water conservation efforts at significant public ex-
pense.265 Some contend that this result is analogous to the land trust 
movement with its privately negotiated conservation easements. But 
land and water are inherently different; these differences make the 
water trust, privatization model inappropriate as the dominant 
model for protecting water resources.266 
 “The central idea of the public trust is preventing the destabiliz-
ing disappointment of expectations held in common but without for-
mal recognition such as title.”267 The public trust doctrine is a more 
appropriate public model for conserving water and addressing the 
fresh water crisis as a human health issue than water markets. 
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IV.   CONCLUSION 
 What constitutes reasonable use of water resources changes over 
time.268 Craig Arnold expressed most eloquently the societal struggles 
accompanying change and the attending benefits once the impulse to 
resist is overcome. I can think of no better way to conclude than with 
his words: 
Transitions are difficult. They involve costs. They redistribute 
power and resources. They require adaptation to changing and 
perhaps unforeseen conditions. They involve letting go of some old 
ways of thinking and adopting new mental constructs, while not 
losing indiscriminately the best of existing ideas, principles, and 
ways of life. They involve uncertainty and ambiguity. But they are 
necessary and inevitable aspects of life. It is common for those who 
are bearing the greatest burdens of change to complain loudly and 
assertively but ultimately to adapt to the changes.269 
In both the distant and more recent pasts, decisionmakers made 
“systemic mistakes involving water conservation and delivery.”270 
The present generation has inherited the consequences of these mis-
takes and so will future generations unless needed changes are im-
plemented. 
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